The Power of Self-Organisation

Aldo Matteucci – DiploFoundation, Geneva

 

We all believe in organisation. We worship the Great (or Intelligent) Organiser in the sky, and we admire great organisers, from Alexander of Macedonia to Napoleon. Our mental structures are ‘wired’ toward organisation – cause and effect yielding vertical structures and an causing an ‘ideal’ or ‘visionary’ order to come into existence.

Diplomacy – a discipline (note the term) that emerged out of absolutism – believes in structures, organisation, and of course universal principles. Nothing is more organised than a Ministry of Foreign Affairs – or so we hope. The minister orders and the diplomat execute his vision. This view is replicated within the embassy. Titles and ranks are outward sings of this fascination with order. The personal validates the structural in a self-perpetuating paradigm.

But is it so?

Democracy is in fact – self-organising[i]. Adam Smith understood the power of self-organising markets. But he could not tear himself away completely from his conceptual blinkers – so he spoke of the ‘invisible hand’ behind the self-organisation. Darwin of course discovered that descent of species was self-organising, even though the underlying processes escaped him. The second half of the XX^th century put our awareness of self-organising systems on a scientific basis: chaos theory is its lynch-pin. But the theory did not percolate past a limited number of people. Internet (the great accelerator) is forcing us all to confront reality – the most powerful natural and social processes are self-organising, not directed or organised.

In the town of Switzerland a 17-year old went on Facebook, and suggested that his cohort celebrate the end of summer with a ‘botellion’. This is the term given in Spain to spontaneous gatherings were egregious quantities of alcohol are drunk and a good time is had by all. Well – except for those who have to clean up after the mess and the police resp. the emergency services, which are overwhelmed by the event.

Within a few days 5’000 had promised to be there. More were expected. Panic soon spread among the authorities. Barricades of paragraphs were tested for strength. The press resonated with the story. The original ‘initiator’ has withdrawn, but the official pressure just elicited counter-pressure. Confrontation looms ahead. Meanwhile it seems that every Swiss city with a significant Facebook community wants to have a ‘boteillon’ of its own.

The business world has already begun consciously to harness the powers of self-organisation. Wikipedia[ii] is the most obvious example. But this business model has been copied many times over. Boeing’s Dreamliner – the 787 – is being built by ‘as broad network of partners who are collaborating in real-time, sharing risk and knowledge to achieve a higher level of performance.[iii] It is not unlikely that within a couple of decades economic power will rest not with the owners of capital, but with these ‘networks’ – with poorly defined property rights. The network that has created the 787 is so unique, and has embedded so much knowhow that it will have become – like Wikipedia – a ‘natural monopoly’. One wonders, incidentally, how traditional international trade policies will deal with such transnational networks.

Meanwhile, diplomacy sails on unfazed, following the old vertical organising model. The UNFCCC is the latest diplomatic craze. Based on the ideology that ‘global problem requires a global solution’ it has achieved nothing since its inception 20 years ago; in fact, it has significantly retarded tackling the problem by trying to get all the ducks in line. To this end it has taken on the impossible task of remedying the past, planning for the future, and sharing the burden of today – all at the same time. No wonder it is foundering.

Self-organising groups are tackling the climate change issues in concrete terms. People (and countries) are changing their consumption habits – not acting selfishly by sitting it out, as the UNFCCC conceptual model postulates. It might not be enough to solve the problem, but is a hell of a lot more than what has been achieved with the ‘top-down’ (or organised) approach so far.

The Doha Development Agenda remains unfulfilled – yet free trade is being advanced through regional free trade arrangements. True, they are suboptimal, but still better than no progress at all. Even labour and social standards are spreading among the ‘sinners’. Not on account of international agreements, but because the buyers insist that such standards be applied when producing the wares they have ordered, and verify it.

Not that diplomacy had not been given warnings over the past centuries. From Machiavelli to Metternich attempts at self-organisation were tried, only to be overwhelmed by hegemonic ambitions. In Europe the EU is the outcome – a self-organising structure at its core. Yet classic diplomacy still hankers for a ‘pecking order’, rather than accepting self-organising multipolarity of interests.

Paraphrasing John Lennon, one may whisper to this or that self-centred ambassador: ‘diplomacy is what happens to you while you are busy (strategically) planning other things’. The latest wave of ‘China bashing’ emerged because the son of Woody Allen, who with his mother is interested in Darfur, launched a campaign to shame China for its support of Sudan. Tibet was the obvious rallying point.

Self-organising groups are grasping the diplomatic initiative everywhere – leaving diplomats non-plussed. It is high time for diplomats to shed their ideological blinkers and join the fray. Principled idealism – in the Platonic sense of higher order behind reality, for which we should strive – is bunk. In fact, it might turn out to be counter-productive: by focusing on the gap between what can be achieved and what ‘ought to be’ in theoretical terms we feel dispirited and despondent. Instead we should be rejoicing that the solution is ‘good enough’.

Self-organising groups produce ‘good enough’ solutions fast and effectively. Wikipedia has been proven to be no worse than the Britannica – on average. It has taken Wikipedia seven years, a few basic rules of operation, no grand design, no bureaucracy, and essentially no budget, to get where Britannica is after 220 years.

We are running out of time. Is it not time to switch to self-organising solutions?

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[i]           The Greeks struggled with this issue. They overcame it by creating a mythological ‘Solon’ – the founding father of the Republic. Whether he existed, whether he did promulgate the laws of Athens is anyone’s guess.

[ii]           Wikipedia is a free,^[5] multilingual, open content encyclopedia project operated by the United States-based non-profit Wikimedia Foundation. Its name is a portmanteau of the words wiki (a technology for creating collaborative websites) and encyclopedia. Launched in 2001 by Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger,^[6] it attempts to collect and summarize all human knowledge in every major language.^[7]

As of April 2008, Wikipedia had over 10 million articles in 253 languages, about a quarter of which are in English.^[2] Wikipedia’s articles have been written collaboratively by volunteers around the world, and nearly all of its articles can be edited by anyone with access to the Wikipedia website.^[8] Having steadily risen in popularity since its inception,^[1] it is currently the largest and most popular general reference work on the Internet.^[

[iii]          Don TAPSCOTT – Anthony D. WILLIAMS (2006): Wikinomics- How mass collaboration changes everything. Atlantic books, London; xii + 351 pp.  p. 225.

 

 

 

 

 

The Dark Side of Diplomacy

Reading books on diplomacy (and even history books on the subject) one might be misled into believing that it is akin to engineering – a matter of precise calculation of advantages and costs. Of course, in practice building bridges is different than drawing plans in an air-conditioned office, so one may expect to get one’s feet dirty, but not one’s hands. The same applies to diplomacy – so the textbooks; nowhere is the ‘dark side of diplomacy’ ever mentioned.

In the years leading up to 1282 Michael VIII Paleologus, Eastern Roman Emperor, was beset by Charles I of Sicily, then the most powerful monarch in Western Europe. To stave off the threat Michael allied himself with Peter III, king of Aragon (Spain). He got Pope Nicholas III to be more than neutral, and bribery was spread around the Papal Court. Giovanni da Procida was sent to Sicily to rally the discontented Sicilians. On 30^th March 1282 Palermo rose, killed the French garrison, and declared the island’s independence. The Sicilian Vespers[i] broke King Charles’ power; but also that of the Papacy. The Avignon exile ensued, and consequently, the Reformation – the Sicilian Vespers were not just a local revolt, they were a pivotal event in European history.

According to the textbooks diplomacy was invented a century or so later – whatever. This bit of history to me shows diplomacy at its fullest if not its ethical best. We see alliances between far-flung kingdoms, bribery, corruption, and surreptitious meddling in another country’s affairs – this is the darker side of diplomacy.

The Venetian Ambassadors to the Sublime Porte were masters in manipulation of the serail. Gifts were spread among the wizirs and beys, often with great effect. Merchants were expected to report home on anything of political and economic interest they’d seen. The debriefings were thorough and much assisted the Republic in surviving the onslaught of the Turks.

Mazarin employed the ruthless Père Joseph to manipulate everyone in and outside France. The ‘secret du roi’ – the precursor of the Deuxième Bureau – was a key instrument of diplomacy, then and later.

Fast-forwarding to today, the UN is routinely spied upon by the Great Powers. Journalists and organisations front for foreign interests. American diplomats are spotted around the Caspian Sea with suitcases full of cash. The US ‘intelligence’ budget is estimated at over 70 billions – 70% of it is outsourced, thus blurring the line between private and public activity. The Vatican blatantly manipulates a mass meeting at the beginning of this year to bring down the centre-left coalition across the Tiber. New elections are called, and the right wins. Benedict XVI publicly expresses his ‘joy’ at the electoral outcome.

I’d say little has changed as far as the ‘dark side of diplomacy’ is concerned – it has just gotten more complex and technical. Yet the diplomacy textbooks blithely ignore it, except for recommending prudence and secrecy as one goes about one’s daily diplomatic business. In a world where there are no spies, bribes or manipulations, one wonders where the dangers come from.

No government will refrain from using ‘the darker side of diplomacy’ if it suits its interests and it is able to use it. The only rule is – don’t get caught; unless it wants to be seen as powerful enough to dictate the outcome. Some governments have moral guidelines – killing may be considered unseemly (until the deed is upgraded to ‘vital interest’). Overuse will blunt the instrument – too many plots on too many fronts are a recipe for ‘blowback’.

For the discerning diplomat this opens up the archane world of ‘conspiracy’ theories. The problem with them all is that – once one accepts the possibility of a conspiracy – their number is infinite, and all more or less equally improbable. Skepticism should be the lens through which she views the diplomatic and political world. It is a wise attitude to take in any case.

As for the teaching of diplomacy – it better confront the fact that ‘the darker side of diplomacy’ is not irrelevant ‘noise’ to be safely ignored when going about the business of teaching the ‘regularities’ of diplomacy and constructing ‘general theories’. Robust, unsanitized teaching, based on ‘case studies’, should be fostered – and damn the emasculated theories. Where to begin? I’d suggest the 1953 US-led coup in Iran against Mossadeq: it still casts a long shadow on the relations between the two countries.

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[i]               Steven RUNCIMAN (1992): The Sicilian Vespers. A history of the Mediterranean world in the later thirteenth century. Canto, Cambridge University Press; xi + 356 pp.

Everyone loves Wikipedia

Yet hardly anyone realises that potential of the underlying (wiki[i] software for streamlining paperwork in an MFA and significantly improving the efficiency of the archiving system.

‘Wiki’ software essentially allows for the organic creation of ‘meta-narratives’, which allow for a symmetric freedom: the writer(s) are not constrained in the detail they may wish to introduce in the narrative, and the reader is not constrained by the need to wade through the detail.

What are key elements of the ‘wiki’ software?

(1) It can grow organically from a basic text. The ‘top layer’ is a simple text (that can itself be edited, or added on, under defined circumstances) that itself can evolve over time. Layers and layers of underlying details are hyper-linked to it in a structured way and can be easily retrieved from the ‘top layer’ narrative, enriching it as required by the reader. The number of layers and the number of links is essentially endless. Stand-alone documents, photos as well as web links can be incorporated. Flexibility is retained, as the all levels within the narrative can be changed to suit the evolving situation. The construction of a ‘wiki’based text is not done in linear fashion, but intuitively to accommodate the idiosycrasies of the participants.

(2) It is run by multiple editors. Many editors can enrich the text – from set pieces to small remarks. This is either done in democratic fashion (through interaction and reciprocity), or under general supervision (eventual inclusion is authorised by the supervisor). This ensures the emergence of different points of view, as well as recording of detail that may have escaped the ‘authorised’ reporter in the ‘stand-alone’ mode. Authorship is traceable, and entries can be challenged (under specified rules).

Ministries now store files and documents electronically. They may obtain multiple labels in their archives. Conceptually, however, these documents all remain ‘stand-alone’ items linked together only by the fact of the reference number(s). They are not merged into a common ‘meta’-narrative. Reconstructing the narrative becomes a complex, repetitive, cumbersome, and in the end thankless task. Items may be overlooked, and forgotten. The ‘stand-alone’ approach, furthermore, is by its very nature selective and reductive. Disjoined information, the telling anecdote or reflection, is lost as a sole document is created.

Lets make the example of the meta-narrative: ‘negotiation of an FTA’. The ‘top-level’ narrative would refer to key events like the mandate, list all major meetings, provide the current draft of an agreement, and list the main open issues. Such a text would represent a brief to the Minister on the current stand of the negotiation.

§ Under the key word ‘mandate’ one would find in an orderly fashion the internal preparatory work;

§ Under the key word ‘meeting’ one would find the reports of the negotions.

§ Under the key word ‘draft’ one would find article by article the current stand as well as the historical development;

§ Under the key work ‘open issues’ one would find the opposite positions to be reconciled.

The Chief Negotiator would supervise the ‘top layer’ narrative. Members of the delegation would have access to and edit lower layers, as appropriate. The editing could be ad hoc, and disjoined, to suit the larger narrative, rather than be constrained by the ‘stand-alone’ framework.

Such ‘narratives’, once concluded, could be used for training purposes. A junior staff member is given the task to learn how to run an FTA negotiation. As he proceeds in an orderly fashion through the ever increasing layers he absorbs the structural emements of the process.

Finally, such ‘narratives’ could be used to create ‘expert systems’ in which the know-how from departing staff is retained. Before leaving, the staff member uses a simple narrative to record it.

Using major narrative themes finally facilitates the supervision, as the supervising entity (principals like ministers or even Parliament) are confronted with a limited number of then and can be selective in the pursuit of the needed detail. Needless to say, the annual ‘meta-narrative’ of the activities of the Ministry could be greatly facilitated.

MCI 28/5/08

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[i] My experience is with the ‘wiki’ software provided by Google. I presume there are other, more professional declinations with ‘whistles and bells’. Such ‘add-ons’ would only enhance the effectiveness of the basic system.

The ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ Revisited

Aldo Matteucci
Senior Fellow, DiploFoundation

Garrett HARDIN[i] argues that where exceedingly numerous ‘rational and economic’ agents exploit a finite resource, only mutual coercion mutually agreed upon can stop the overexploitation of the ‘commons’. He states: “The only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.”

HARDIN denies that ‘the invisible hand’ – individuals acting locally – can solve the problem, for the root of the tragedy of the commons lies in ‘situational ethics’. Individuals acting rationally to exploit a resource would have to change their behaviour to take into account the emerging scarcity. It is not in the individual interest to switch unless all (or a majority) does, hence the consequent destruction of the common resource.

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We find many natural instances akin to ‘situational ethics’ in both inanimate and animate nature. Sand can be shapeless dust, something like to a liquid, or a brick, depending on how close the grains are to each other. Phase transitions from gas to liquid to solids are again such instances – where the rules change rapidly. In all cases only local rules – light chemical bonds – apply.

Flocks of birds in flight, or fish as a school also show behaviour akin to ‘situational ethics’ when, coming together, they proceed to move in concert, elegantly, swiftly, as if ordered by an invisible hand, or an intelligent designer. Who has seen the starlings over the setting skies of Rome knows of the infinity variety and beauty of these designs. Computer simulations show that local rules (in birds e.g. simple rules about distance from the surrounding animals) allow the emergence of the common flight patters at will. There is no need for ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed’ at each and every move, rather infinite variations on the theme of local behavioural rules.

In the case of humanity, HARDIN’s conundrum is self-inflicted. He first creates a cardboard – one-dimensional – view of a human person, and then, predictably, blames him for being so. The fact is: humans are not ‘rational and selfish’ only, but have multiple set of behavioural rules – we call them identities – and they switch them off and on depending on the situation[ii]. A person in the bosom of his family will act differently than when he is in public, or in a crowd, or at the office. Nor is he situationally constrained in his behaviour: he is able (more or less) freely to override the situational ‘default’ identity and innovate. If he finds that the new rules works, or works better, he’ll adopt it. Others will take it up, and the effect may spread across the population. Manias and panics spread that way, but also adaptive behaviour.

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It is said that for a state to collapse it only needs for good people to do nothing. True. One may just as well argue, however, that for a state to survive it only needs for a few good people to do the (new) right thing.

HARDIN’s solution – mutual coercion, mutually agreed by the majority – certainly is a valid solution. It is important to realise thst it is not the only solution, nor often the easiest and quickest one.

What it happening at the moment in ‘climate change’ is evidence of this insight. While the HARDIN solution – the UNFCCC process – is mired in controvery and essentially in the doldrums, adaptive behaviour based on local initiatives is spreading fast, at all levels. It does not always need a majority, just a few good examplary deeds, to lead the way.

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[i] Garrett HARDIN (1968): “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162 (1968):1243-1248.

[ii] For a good survey of the subject see Amartya SEN (2006): Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny. Allan Lane. London; xx + 215 pp.

Diplomacy Is Where There Are No Rules

Aldo Matteucci
Senior Fellow, DiploFoundation

He had bought a large map representing the sea,Without the least vestige of land:And the crew were much pleased when they found it to beA map they could all understand.
Lewis CARROLL: The hunting of the Snark

I’d made this comment recently in an off-hand sort of way. I’ve been challenged – so I must stand by my words: diplomacy is where there are no rules.

Let me explain the assertion with an analogy. At the dawn of the electronic age gadgets were all stand-alone. They were not able to inter-connect and communicate. Frustration all around. Slowly, protocols (sic) were established, growing into full-fledged interfaces. Now, it’s: ‘plug and play’. Until an agreement (sic) was reached on how to connect the two pieces of equipment there were no rules, just an unexplored set of possibilities. Multiple solutions were possible. Sitting down and agreeing on one common set of rules that works for both equipments is what diplomacy is all about. Diplomacy is the process by which inchoate possibilities between two principals are transformed into a set of agreed rules. Once diplomacy has established the rules, it will graciously yield its place (and titles) to administration.

How do we get there? It may be trial and error (akas plug and pray): some nerd may find a solution that just happens to work, in a jury-rigged sort of way. Or the process may be a layered and sequential (top-down) one: first a common architecture (a rough outline if you wish) is created, and then lower levels of detail are filled in. In both instances the outcome is the same, however. As the main rules are created, the set of infinite possibilities (the hyperspace of diplomatic outcomes) slowly withers, and eventually disappears. Which way is best depends on circumstances – and the time frame. We may observe youthful periods of creative innovation alternating with mature times of codification and proper (re-)structuring.

The same applies to relations among nations. At the outset, there were no ways to communicate between ‘sovereign states’ – or whatever the brutes in each group saw themselves to be at the dawn of civilisation. In a slow and creative process the first protocols were established, and the network became successively more intricate. Diplomacy is the taming of the strange, cutting the first road through a virgin forest.

Traders were the first diplomats – why? When traders first met strangers, and they had not yet words in common, the handy artefact, the gleaming stone, the food was the common object that could cross the ‘divide of strangeness’, and establish a bridging commonality. A smile ensued, a nod, and it all started from there. The choice of what first to offer to the other side was the diplomatic feat, and much care was devoted to finding the right thing to signify the wish to find a common ground. Women were probably the first to cross the divide of strangeness – often involuntarily – they were the first ambassadors.

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A quaint reflection? What does this image mean for today’s diplomatic work? A lot, I’d argue.

(1) Diplomacy worth its salt is essentially a creative and innovative process. We may whittle down the realm of possibilities somewhat through a pre-set style, but at a point the creative act takes over: it’s “provare and riprovare”, as Galileo said – try and reject – until the winning combination is found. Diplomatic work is not routine, or it is not diplomacy.

(2) If diplomacy indeed is a matter of ‘taming of the strange’, then the outcome can only be ‘conventions’ – agreements whose essential quality is that they exist. No lifting the veil of ignorance to uncover an underlying grand plan or intelligent design – be it immanent (as religious inclined poeple would have it) or utopian (as idealists dream of).

To draw an example from evolution (the greatest diplomatic exercise of them all in a way) in the beginning a few viable body plans (vertebrates, insects etc.) evolved, mainly by happenstance in a wildly changeable environment[i]. Out of the known twenty or so, only five phyla were successful[ii]; the others either were sidelined, or died out. Once the body plans were in place, families and species branched out under them in no detectable order – the outcome of Darwinian selection. Creativity is the triumph of the contingent over the essential, and reality is made of clumps of congealed contingency.

Machiavelli was right. There is no immanent order in international relations; agreements are just agglutinations of political will whose only claim is that they exist, to be discarded when they are no longer useful. And fast-forwarding to the present, the ‘end of history’ is not so much that democracy has fulfilled history’s immanent plan or is in some way inherently superior: it is the ‘policy-plan’ that happens to have survived (remember Zho Enlai on democracy: too early to tell[iii]). The same goes for international relations: the current world architecture is neither pre-ordained nor immutable because in any way superior. We need not be squeamish about tinkering with it. Let’s face it: principles, values, and structures are just higher-order contingencies.

(3) As for the practice of diplomacy: finding an optimal or at least a workable path amidst the wealth of possibilities calls for working at two levels at once: the detail close up, miniature-like, and the whole, at a distance. As the artist steps back to view the detail within the structure of the whole, the diplomat must from time to time step back from his work and ask himself: Where is the negotiation going? The best diplomats are those that are able to take a ‘walk in the wood’, but also those who know when to walk away from a negotiation. An ability to ‘walk through the looking glass’ is in my view the diplomat’s foremost quality. In this light Molotov was no great diplomat.

(4) No sooner had Adam been created, that was asked to name all animals. For those illiterate of the Bible there is its comic-strip version: “Me Tarzan. You Jane” utters the innocent forest dweller as he encounters the fascinating strange. At its most essential, the name – the way we look at a reality – defines the issue. Among the many possible names, one is chosen. The first and often the most important as well as most creative diplomatic task is that of ‘naming’ of the diplomatic challenge ahead, for common ground implies a common point of view. Whether Israel is a ‘homeland’ or a ‘neo-colonialist enterprise’ defines everything else. Diplomats should (and will) fight over the narrative line to be used in explaining to themselves and others what they are doing – and again this is a task without precedent, the first human creative act. Soft power[iv] is all about the ability to ‘name’.

Naming can be a matter of sheer power – as the Iraq case makes clear. Naming may be the result of skilful manipulation of ignorance[v].

Naming can emerge as if by chance, or by ‘scientific analysis’[vi]. A ‘name’ can be useful, or distortive for the ensuing negotiations.

(5) If creating rules where there are none is a contingent and creative task, then the diplomat need also be an accomplished opportunist – ‘Anything goes’ his only rule where the are no rules. A diplomat needs to see opportunities where others see barriers and movement where others see stasis. The current emphasis on proper procedures and the priority of precedent suppresses the creative spirit one would expect in a diplomat. So is transforming the diplomat into the servile agent of the political principal; we are sure to create sedulous yet ineffective busy-bodies.

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Life is a field of unending possibilities that over time collapses into a host of diverging and whimsical realities. If we were to set the clock back to one billion year ago, and let life run again, we would not see our familiar ‘life’ emerge anew. Human history is no different, nor will it be, as long as we have true diplomats.

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[i] Stephen J. GOULD (1998): Wonderful life. The Burgess Shale and the nature of history. Penguin, London; 347 pp.

[ii] Lynn MARGULIS (1988): Five Kingdoms. An illustrated guide to the phyla of life on earth. Freeman, New York; 376 pp.

[iii] Simon LEYS (1998) : Essais sur la Chine. Laffont, Paris ; 825 pp..

[iv] Joseph Jr. S. NYE (2004): Soft Power. The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs, NY.; 197 pp.

[v] For a recent case of skilful manipulation of the ‘naming’ issue, see Noel MALCOLM (1996) : Bosnia – A short history. MacMillan, London, U.K.; xxiv + 360 pp.

[vi] Climate change has neen ‘named’ an ‘environmental issue’. This is correct, as far as the causal origin of the problem goes. Tackling climate change as an ‘environmental’ issue may be highly distortive, though. For it focuses the diplomats’ attention of the causes rather than the effects. It is the effects that may cause the harm, however, and at any one time we have the choice between mitigation of the causes or adaptation to the effects – or both. Any strategy we chose, furthermore, requires us to make comparisons and set priorities. Mankind has many of them, and the framework we must use vto compare them is the one of economic development. In this framework, climate change is but one, albeit important as it is novel, constraint. By viewing climate change as an ‘environmental’ issue a wedge is driven between environment and development.

Can We Really Teach Diplomacy?

This is a provocative question for a Foundation that aims to teach diplomatic skills. Yet it is a question that crossed my mind as I was preparing a series of teaching modules on Climate Change Diplomacy.

We teach administration of diplomacy – the humdrum tasks of setting up a diplomatic post, getting organised, ensuring accountability and administrative processes and reporting, networking both at home and abroad. Rights and obligations, as under the Vienna Convention, are analysed, practices and customs explained.

We teach the ins and outs multilateral processes – how multilateral diplomacy organises itself at a conference, or how it interacts with international organisations. The proper diplomatic etiquette and the formal and informal rules of procedure are outlined. Specialities are highlighted – as appropriate.

We teach diplomatic structures – the multifarious plenitude of international organisations, their links and respective responsibilities, or the institutional rules under which they operate.

We teach the outcomes of diplomatic work – the treaties, agreements, understandings, the rights and obligations hereunder, and how they are administered, or made to evolve along the trajectory set out in the basic instruments.

We teach the language and the jargon, so as better to understand the deeper meaning of the counterpart’s words. While diplomacy of yore aimed to communicate to insiders, now multiple stake-holders and audiences are addressed – public diplomacy has emerged.

In a post-modern world of complex networks and means of communication we teach efficient sourcing, organisation of information as well as its distribution.

The darker underside of diplomacy shall be mentioned passim – from spying to corruption, profiling of counterparts, or manipulating of people, press, and public opinion – for this important component on diplomatic practice is not acknowledged in academia.

But do we really teach diplomacy?

Are we able to explain to young diplomats why some negotiations succeed and other fail? Some fail for contingent reasons – wrong tactics. Are we providing them with enough ‘lessons learned’? Others fail because conflicts in values that underlie a negotiation have remained undetected and unresolved. Failure is due to lack of ‘common ground’ where compromises may be struck. The failure is then strategic. Are we able to teach diplomatic strategy?

The case of Climate Change Diplomacy might illustrate my point. Two contingent elements have driven the onset of the negotiation:

The success story of the CFC Convention in mitigating output of these gases. The negotiation was (as such things go) straight-forward, and the outcome (so it appears today) satisfactory. Implicitly this model was chosen as a viable precursor for scaling up to the more complex issue of mitigation of Greenhouse Gases (GHG).
Faced with a ‘global problem’ the ‘logical’ or technological approach seemed to be one of aiming for a ‘global’ mitigation solution – in order to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (as described by G. Hardin[1]).
The current state of Climate Change Negotiations does not bode well for its future.

At the tactical level the ‘scaling up’ is foundering because it intertwines inextricably past and present in an acrimonious finger pointing exercise over GHG emissions – what are the lessons learned?

At the strategic level it focuses on just one – a collective – solution, ignoring or underestimating other, albeit less perfect but possibly more practical, approaches as well as adaptation. The economist R. H. Coase[2], however, had long made the case that all possible alternative approaches should be assessed pragmatically.

Garrett HARDIN, in his famous ‘The tragedy of the commons’ argued – frpom theory – for strict and compulsory birth control policies, claiming that mankind would not possibly stabilise its population unless forced to do so through mutual coercion. Forty years later it looks as if he is being proven wrong. An inchoate mix of pro-active policies (China) as well as wealth and education effects is taking us there – belatedly I’ll admit, imperfectly and haphazardly. We did not develop a ‘coherent and comprehensive set of policies’, as experts would have insisted on. ‘Good enough’ policies emerged, disjoined, incoherent, and absurd in part, though in the end cumulatively effective. Had we all heeded Hardin’s suggestion and sat down in ’68 to repeal the UN Charter of Human Rights passage on family planning – and gone for a world-wide treaty on mutual coercion… where would be now?

More fundamental, however, is the issue underlying Hardin’s text. He argues, from the outset that, for certain problems: “…to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation.” The underlying issue (what he describes as the ‘tragedy of the commons’) is one of situational ethics. Though one may argue – at the limit – that all ethic is situational (we’d condone the killing of a tyrant, don’t we?), some behaviour is not bad per se, only when everyone does it – like pollution. While we know how to deal with non-situational ethics (“Though shalt not kill” possibly being a good example), it is difficult to achieve a consensus in other cases, when in addition the novel situations creep on us surreptitiously.

An added problem is sensationalism in press and public. Even if we were to fulfill all of the Millennium Goals by 2015, humanity would have witnessed 250 million deaths from poverty-related causes[3]. We seem to be forgetting these goals as we focus political and entrepreneurial attention on climate change that may or may not displace as many million people over the whole century. True, climate change will exacerbate poverty problems, but given a choice, a direct approach might be far more effective than a circuitous approach through GHG mitigation.

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At its best diplomacy is all about discovering/creating ‘degrees of freedom’ in inter-state relations: turning obstacles into solutions by destroying preconceptions and pre-ordained conceptual frameworks – the egg of Columbus comes to mind. The rest is mechanics.

So my questions would be:

How do we teach diplomats to recognise, and possibly favour, ‘good enough’ policies rather than aiming single-mindedly for a ‘theoretical’ and unachievable best?
How do we teach diplomats to recognise, understand, and name core issues in a negotiation, rather than remain mired in process?
How do we teach diplomats to have a sense of proportion, and priorities?
For the current approach in education is to ‘think locally’ – to provide quick and ready technical fixes (down to the mini-course via internet), and let the ‘invisible diplomatic hand’ take care of the rest. This approach is certainly useful in many practical and humdrum situations. At the cutting edge of ‘big issues’, however, it is bound to fail – at least in the relevant short run. The balancing of benefits and costs of globalisation would be such a big issue; another is the uneasy compromise between cultures in an ever integrating world; and certainly the biological future of our planet.

In a world that praises the quick fix, the sound bite, and the successful spin, deep and wide understanding is needed to solve the issues on which our long term survival depends. How are we to teach this to our diplomats?

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[1] Garrett HARDIN (1968): The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162:1243-1248
[2] Ronald H. COASE (1960): The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44.
[3] Thomas POGGE (2008) : Growth and inequality : understanding recent trends and political choices. Dissent.

Does the Subprime Crisis Hold Lessons for a MFA?

Some of the best managed entities in the business world – transnational financial institutions – have been caught wrong footed. Past dealing with the immediate consequences of their errors, banks are changing their structures better to meet the challenges ahead.

A first structural lesson that seems to be emerging is a clearer articulation of the functions of the Board. Strategy, risk assessment, and management supervision are now identified as separate functions. To facilitate the fulfilment of these tasks, dedicated working groups are created. Far from being an added layer of control, this new structure indicates the recognition that the total is more than the sum of its parts and that a holistic approach is needed.

A second lesson is spreading power within management. Oligarchies tend replace hegemonic structures. Checks and balances will replace power struggles and cumulation of tasks will become less frequent.

A third lesson is likely to be stronger focus on outcomes and longer term results. Quality will find its place side by side quantitative objectives and results.

Are there lessons to be drawn for MFA?

Modern MFA structures tend to follow the ‘principal-agent’ model. The Minister (or Cabinet) is the Paramount Principal, and the MFA is a set of hierarchically structured agents that fulfil the Principal’s orders. At each hierarchical level the same ‘principal-agent’ subordinate relationship applies.  Feedback and information percolates up the same structures.

This schematic view highlights several systemic flaws:

(1)               Distortion of signals in transmission. Just as the ‘principal’s’ order may be distorted on the way down to execution, so does the information and feedback. Contrary to private firms, where the market provides unassailable feedback to management through the balance sheet, no such channels exist in the public sector.

(2)               Vertical power structures. The separation of power between the ‘principal’ and ‘agent(s)’, which is clearest at the interface between the political and the administrative realms, tends to repeat itself within the administration. The space for internal validation, i.e. check and balances, remains limited.

(3)               Lack of the global and long term view. In a world where in any case political survival is the overarching goal of the Principal, no structures provide counter-balance. Parliamentary scrutiny is inherently partisan, and even in Cabinet trade-offs among ministries replace independence of views on the topic under discussion.

Whether the current vertical power structures suit policy objectives as well as the personal ambitions of politicians is a matter for never ending debate. A return to the role of political power as an intermediary between a robust administration whose task is to prepare policy and the rough and tumble of partisan politics is worth some renewed consideration.

Meanwhile, some thought might be given to strengthening the global and longer term perspective, which would include both strategy and risk. These issues should be part of the regular agenda, possibly in form of permanent Working Groups of the MFA managerial structure. Some thought may also be given to the possibility of enlarging the Board with outside (and politically independent) directors, whose task would also be to help offset distortions in transmission by providing unfiltered views and know-how.

 

Plagiarism: Can 85% of Students be Wrong?

Yesterday, the Tribune de Geneve published on its cover page the news that 85% of university students in the United States are involved in plagiarism. (One should praise the US for facing and making this problem public. One can imagine what the situation is in European universities with mega-classes of 300-500 students writing papers in non-English languages!) The article may give rise to numerous responses. One is that something must be wrong with society if 85% of the future elite is breaching not only legal but also basic ethical rules. But another response is to ask if 85% percent can be wrong. Is something wrong with them or with the anti-plagiarism rule or with the broader system? Let us start with the anti-plagiarism rule. It is still valid. It involves also the basic decency to mention the source of one’s ideas.

If 85% cannot be wrong and if the rule is right, what is wrong? The educational system? The system should make ethical behaviour both rational and pragmatic. But this is not the case in modern universities. Students are often asked to write long essays under pressure. Academic calendars are increasingly demanding. Faced with this pressure, many students opt for the rational solution which is “copy and paste” from the Internet. Can students be punished for being rational and pragmatic? At least rationality and pragmatism are one of the cherished values in modern society. The article in the Tribune de Geneve discusses how to deal with the effects of the plagiarism: How to identify it? How to punish students? There are only a few lines hinting that something is wrong with the current educational system.

Does the educational system need a major change? I think so. The current situation is not sustainable either for society or individuals. It nurtures collective hypocrisy. Tacitly, everybody involved in the process is aware of the plagiarism, but nobody wants to “rock the boat.” Everybody has his or her own rational approach (making the situation more difficult). Society requires numbers from the university (more students, more degrees, etc.). Most academic staff, pressed by “publish or perish,” see teaching and interaction with students as a secondary activity (research is primary). Teaching is very often delegated to assistants and tutors. Academic staff does not have an interest in rocking the boat. Students are rational as well. Ultimately, society expects from them the piece of paper and qualifications. It is what increasingly matters in a highly formalised society.

The situation is not sustainable. Probably today, in a time of pressure of numbers and hyper-production, there is more need than ever before to have the university a place for “thinking out of the box.”

So far the focus in discussion is on identifying better anti-plagiarism software (not on addressing broader and deeper issues). Like terrorism, poverty and other problems of modern society, we mix causes and effects and we do not see the forest for the three. 85% cannot be wrong!

Link to the article in the Tribune de Geneve

Geneva, 9th of November 2007